After a month's delay, the 10+1 summit between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China will be held over the weekend in Cebu, in the Philippines. As before, the United States will watch with some nervousness.

From a geopolitical angle, China's importance to Southeast Asia should have been greater than any other power inside or outside Asia. But for much of the time since World War II (WWII), China's role was either ignored or constantly questioned and blocked due to international and domestic circumstances.

Around the time of the Bandong Conference in 1955, the relationship between China and Southeast Asia appeared to enjoy a brief warming period, but it was soon overwhelmed by mutual suspicions in the Cold-War climate.

ASEAN was originally formed in 1967 not to work for regional economic cooperation as it is today but to guard against and counter China. The two sides were not able to improve ties until the early 1990s. The experience of the past 40 years can be summed up in two realities.

One is that most ASEAN members are smaller countries, whose survival often depends on the outside world. This means that their China policies and strategies can be easily swayed by global political and economic currents.

Most Southeast Asian nations have relied on the United States and Japan economically since WWII and China was initially ASEAN's perceived adversary. This and the fact that China was politically at odds with the West at that time compelled Southeast Asian nations to stand opposite China.

Later on, though, these countries started looking for the point of strategic balance between China and the West as relations improved.

The second fact is that Southeast Asian countries, especially the founding members of ASEAN, have put their foreign policies at the mercy of utilitarianism and realist principles. While ideological differences were undeniably a negative factor in the past, current and potential interests can render such differences insignificant.

Southeast Asian nations were still doubtful when China's economy began to surge, but they tweaked their foreign and economic strategies as soon as they saw clearly what China's modernization drive had to offer.

For instance, during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, China went all out to help these countries recover, which in turn led to the gradual strategic shift of their policies towards China.

For its part, China has made some commendable policy adjustments in the past 10 years. Two aspects deserve emphasis.

The first is reflected in the tremendous efforts, including some major compromises, China has made to win the trust of ASEAN members. The 10+1 format constitutes a pragmatic and effective process for conducting useful dialogue. It eventually resulted in the historic progress of China's joining the ASEAN non-aggression treaty although it is not a member of the association.

China's willingness to put aside territorial disputes over the Nansha Islands (the Spratleys) also helped relieve diplomatic friction caused by the "China threat" clamor.
 
The second aspect lies in China's foresighted proposal to set a definite goal to anchor its relations with ASEAN on a long-term basis to create a 10+1 free trade zone by the year 2010. This has led to a clear turning point in ASEAN's China policy.

For the past five years or so, China's exchanges with ASEAN have largely centered on this pivotal goal. The pursuit of a common market has not only convinced both sides to deal with each other in more depth but has helped their ties weather various distractions.

Currently, China and ASEAN are closer than at any other time in recent history. The 10+1 commemorative summit held in Nanning, capital of South China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, late last year serves as a clear proof.

However, both sides need to understand each other better. Their mutual trust has to be deepened.

When I was invited to share my analysis of China-ASEAN relations on Phoenix TV's current affairs talk show, the discussion stirred some interest among scholars. So I would like to make a few points clearer.

First, China must commit more efforts and resources to its relations with Southeast Asian nations while seeking a more active role in regional and world affairs. It is particularly important for China to secure stability on its own doorstep or its efforts on the larger world stage will be distracted by uncertainties in its own backyard.

From a geographical, historical, economic and cultural point of view, China is capable of making Southeast Asia a key area that will further enhance its status as a global player. China should not undertake hegemonic strategies towards its southern neighbors as the United States did with the Monroe Doctrine.

With ASEAN as a focus in its broad global vision, China will play a bigger and more constructive role in all regional affairs. From academics to the general public, China's understanding of Southeast Asia is not yet in sync with the reorientation of the country's development strategy.

Most people in the country still seem to be fixated on Europe and North America. As a matter of fact, Southeast Asia is an indispensable partner for China on its way to a larger global stage.

Then there is America. While China and the United States find more of their national interests overlapping these days, the potential conflict of interest between the two looms everywhere, particularly in Southeast Asia. The best thing for China to do is to prevent this region from becoming an arena of contention and rivalry between the big powers.

Du Ping is a senior writer with Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao newspaper.

(China Daily January 11, 2007)