By Li Guofu

The Gulf is overcast with the dark clouds of war, with the international community seriously concerned about the likelihood of a US attack on Iran.

US President George W. Bush increased the administration's show of force early this year, ordering another aircraft carrier battle group and more Patriot missile defense batteries to be deployed to the Gulf to prevent Iran from dominating the Middle East.

At the same time, US forces in Iraq raided the Iranian consulate in Baghdad, resulting in the arrest of several Iranian diplomatic personnel. The US government claimed it had obtained substantial evidence that Iran had supplied weapons to Islamic insurgents in Iraq.

The United States is determined to strike at terrorists and armed insurgents entering Iraq from Iran and Syria and cut off their supply routes. Last month, Vice-President Dick Cheney went so far as to state that "all options are on the table" if Iran continues to defy UN-led efforts to end its nuclear ambitions. "All options" being understood as including a military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran, meanwhile, has shown no fear in the face of mounting US saber rattling. It has held large-scale military exercises in the Gulf and tested new missiles, while warning Washington it would hurt American interests worldwide if attacked by the US first. Iran has also sped up its research and development of nuclear technology.

This fang-baring face-off between Iran and the US is pushing their already tense relations to a breaking point. On January 14, the Kuwaiti press claimed the US would launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities before April, while US mainstream media reported that the Pentagon had allegedly worked out an action plan for attacks on Iran.

It is safe to say that Bush's newly adjusted policy is tougher and more aggressive than before and therefore more threatening. It is fair to say the growing tension between the US and Iran has increased the likelihood of a US strike on Iran, but the outcome will most likely be just a scare.

The aim of Bush's Iran policy at the moment is to bring about change by increasing pressure on Teheran. By keeping "all options on the table", especially the use of military force, the US intends to maintain maximum pressure on Iran to change its stand on the nuclear issue.

As international pressure has begun to have positive effects on Iran, a rash military action against Iran would most likely result in helping the Iran hawks gain popularity.

The US is now exerting more pressure on Iran from several directions, including the military threat; political pressure, mainly in joint actions with the European Union to push for increased UN Security Council sanctions against Iran; financial measures to cut off Iran's monetary connection with the outside world; and the formation of a regional alliance against Teheran in a bid to further isolate the Islamic Republic in the Gulf region.

It should be pointed out that the US is not just using a big stick on Iran but luring it with carrots as well. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said clearly not long ago that she was ready to hold talks with Iranian officials anywhere if Teheran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment.

Washington then expressed willingness to participate in the upcoming international conference on ways to stabilize the Iraqi situation without barring Iran.

Though Iran has repeatedly dismissed US pressure as psychological warfare, the country is in fact taking the threat seriously, as shown in its frequent military exercises and preparation for war.

Dealing with the growing demand by the international community to halt its uranium enrichment operations, Iran has also been playing two hands.

While refusing to compromise on the uranium enrichment issue, Teheran has expressed the hope of resuming negotiations. It keeps emphasizing that both sides can discuss anything, including a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment. At the same time, Teheran claims it would never accept the precondition of "ending enrichment before talks".

Meanwhile, Iran continues to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and allows the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities. It has also refrained from a radical response to some of the more provocative maneuvers by the US so as not to give Washington any excuse to fire the first shot.

There is little doubt Iran was surprised by the swift and unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Iran at the end of last year. The resolution put the Islamic Republic on the defensive internationally.

As a result, several political heavyweights, including National Interest Assurance Committee Chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani and former President Mohammad Khatami, publicly criticized the Ahmadinejad government's foreign policies and its handling of the nuclear issue in a show of high-level dissent rarely seen in Iran.

According to the country's constitution, the Supreme Leader of Iran is Grand Ayatollah Ali Khomenei, not President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Therefore, under the threat of US military buildup in the Gulf and unfavorable international opinion, it is possible that Iran will change its stand on the uranium enrichment issue at a critical moment.

This kind of policy shift has happened before. For instance, Iran resisted heavy pressure from the European Union only to compromise at the last minute some years back, leading to the signing of the Paris Agreement and Teheran Agreement.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Iran nuclear issue concerns the US as well as Iran's key strategic interests. Even if Teheran's stand on nuclear development changes, it would only achieve a temporary relaxation of tension between the two sides. It would hardly bring about a fundamental change in Iran's stand on nuclear development nor substantial change in Washington's Iran policy.

To a certain extent, the Iran nuclear issue is in essence the sum of all fears in US-Iran relations. The tension between the two countries over the nuclear issue will persist until bilateral ties are substantially improved. That also means it is impossible to completely rule out the possibility of escalating conflicts, unexpected flare-ups or relapses following improvement.

The author is a researcher with the China International Studies Institute.

(China Daily March 8, 2007)