Most promisingly, perhaps, the two statesmen issued a joint communiqué which spelled out the scope of the confidence-building measures on which they had agreed in more detail than usual. Both sides now acknowledge the existence of "tense situations" around the Diaoyu Island; this is the first time that Japan has explicitly referred to the islands as a focus of dispute, even though no agreement could be reached beyond acknowledging that the two countries have differing views. The second point of the communiqué declared a joint intention to "overcome political difficulties" relating to 20th-century history by "squarely facing up to history," a well-established Chinese formulation. The problem here is that the wording of the communiqué allows a certain amount of "wiggle room" for interpretation: obviously, China will be watching closely to see how Japan chooses to interpret its commitments on "historical issues."

The other points covered in the joint communiqué concerned the revival of joint attempts to ensure that communications are adequate to avert accidental clashes between Chinese and Japanese navies and air forces patrolling the area. This is an obviously sensible initiative which has been largely put on ice since relations deteriorated two years ago, and its resumption is most welcome. Finally, the two leaders repeated their commitment to continuing dialogue on the basis of the existing documents laying down guidelines for bilateral relations following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972.

These indicators of a common desire to improve relations are of course most welcome, but it remains to be seen what further actions will follow. The China-Japan relationship is one of the most complex and potentially disruptive in the region, characterized by suspicion on many levels. Strategically, the alliance between Japan and the United States would seem to pose the most difficulties for China, but in fact Japan is potentially even more dangerous to Chinese interests in issues when the country is operating without the direct support of the U.S., for instance, in the East China Sea or in redefining the principles of its military strategy. China and Japan are both determined not to let the other acquire a dominant position in regional economic affairs, too. While Japan is happy to see China excluded from the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership, China likewise proposes to establish the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank without Japanese participation. There are deep fault lines in this relationship, and considerable patience will be required to resurrect it.

But, at least in his willingness to discuss these issues frankly with Mr Abe, President Xi Jinping has made a solid start on this long-term enterprise. We can only hope that increased economic cooperation will provide the relationship with a stronger base and that unnecessary provocations can be avoided, particularly in regard to the disputed islands and the historical issue. Both are rightly seen in China as indications of Japan's real attitude towards its largest neighbor, and thus indications of the likelihood of genuine improvement in relations.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit:

http://www.ccgp-fushun.com/opinion/timcollard.htm

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